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RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND THE LAW
THE HONORABLE DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAINt

"We live by symbols"'--don't we? Symbols communicate
ideas, promote loyalty, denote community, import values, foster
virtues, advance causes, express acceptance, and convey respect.
Symbols cut to the quick as words often cannot.
The potency of symbols is, much of the time, for the best.
But sometimes not. "[W]hat is one man's comfort and inspiration
is another's jest and scorn."2 That is as true for symbols as for
innumerable other ideas, values, and causes. Though symbols
can build, bind, and bond, they can just as easily destroy and
divide. The stronger the symbol, the greater the tension between
these poles.
Nowhere is this tension more evident than with religious
symbols. To some these symbols further faith, teach truth, and
command respect; to others they invite dispute, signal
persecution, and spur hostility. Controversy seems greatest
when a religious symbol is displayed publicly-especially when
government is involved.
Such controversy has generated
innumerable legal disputes.
The nature of some of those disputes-and how they have
been addressed-warrants attention. In this Article I explore the
efforts of two judicial bodies-the federal court on which I sit and
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights-to
negotiate some of the challenges presented by disputes over
religious symbols. I begin by surveying some major judicial
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit-my court-involving challenges to the public display of
I United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit; A.B., St. John's University, 1957; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1963; LL.M.,
University of Virginia, 1992. The views expressed herein are my own and do not
necessarily reflect the view of my colleagues or of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. I would like to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of
Kristen Mann and Scott Stewart, my law clerks, in preparing this article.
1 John Marshall, From the Bench, February 4, 1901, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 266, 270 (Oliver Wendell Holmes ed., 1920).
2 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633
(1943).
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religious symbols. I then review the Grand Chamber's recent
decision in the case of Lautsi v. Italy,' which upheld Italy's
requirement that crucifixes be placed in state classrooms. I close
by teasing out some trends and lessons from these cases.
I
A
In recent years, the Ninth Circuit has considered several
challenges to the public display of religious symbols. Those
challenges have generally involved a claim that publicly
displaying such a symbol violates the Establishment Clause of
the United States Constitution, the clause, of course, which
provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."'
The meaning of the Establishment Clause has been hotly
disputed since 1791. The United States Supreme Court has said
that the Clause at least means that "government may not
promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or
organization, may not discriminate among persons on the basis of
their religious beliefs and practices, may not delegate a
governmental power to a religious institution, and may not
involve itself too deeply in such an institution's affairs."5
The Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, bars
government "from conveying or attempting to convey a message
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
6
preferred."
The Supreme Court has said, moreover, that the

3 Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Several Ninth Circuit cases have involved analogous
provisions in the State of California's constitution. See, e.g., Paulson v. City of San
Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Carpenter v. City & Cnty. of
San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1996); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d
1518, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993); Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1565 (9th Cir. 1991). I
focus here on Establishment Clause cases and address these cases only so far as
they bear on Establishment Clause cases.
6 Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989).
6 Id.
at 593 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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"touchstone" of the Establishment Clause is the requirement of
"governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion."I
Our Supreme Court has developed a variety of tests to apply
the Clause to concrete disputes. Two tests are particularly
important in disputes over public displays of religious symbols.
The first stems from the decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman. Under
the Lemon test, to survive an Establishment Clause challenge a
government action or policy at issue (1) must have a secular
purpose, (2) cannot have the principal effect of advancing
religion, and (3) cannot cause "excessive
government
entanglement with religion." The second and third prongs have
at times been taken to ask, together, "whether the challenged
governmental practice has the effect of endorsing religion." 0 The
Lemon test has been applied to a broad array of Establishment
Clause challenges, some involving the public display of religious
symbols. The Supreme Court has recently developed a second
test specifically for Establishment Clause challenges to religious
monuments and displays." I discuss this test a little later.12
B
It is in the shadow of Lemon that my court has decided many
of its cases involving religious displays. One example is one of
my own cases, Kreisner v. City of San Diego, " which held that
the City of San Diego did not violate the Establishment Clause
by permitting a private group to erect a religious display in a
public park during the Christmas season. 4
The display in Kreisner consisted of eight scenes from the
New Testament situated in a small, open-air amphitheater that
itself sat in a public park." Each scene contained "life-size

McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)
(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
8 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
1 Id. at 612-13.
'0 Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
11 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005).
12 See infra Part I.C.
13 1 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1993).
14 Id. at 789.
15 Id. at 777.
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statuary depicting a biblical scene from the life of Christ, a
painted backdrop, and a descriptive sign."" "Each scene [was]
housed in a palm-covered booth ten feet high and fourteen feet
wide."" Seven of the scenes included gospel passages.s The
display was accompanied by a disclaimer sign stating that the
display was "privately sponsored and not allied with the City.""
The sponsor did not pay a fee to use the amphitheater, but did
reimburse the city for the estimated cost of electricity that the
display consumed.2 0
Howard Kreisner, a park user, sued to prevent the city from
allowing the sponsor to erect the display on public property.
Kreisner contended that the city's decision to permit the display
in the park violated the Establishment Clause.2 ' After finding
that the city "followed a first-come, first-served policy" in issuing
permits for park use, the district court ruled that permitting the
display on public property did not violate the Establishment
Clause.22
Applying the Lemon test, we affirmed. At Lemon's first
prong, our court concluded that the city's decision to permit the
display was supported by a legitimate and sincere secular
purpose: promoting free expression. 23 The court next ruled that
the display did not have the primary effect of advancing religion
because the display was private speech in a traditional public
forum that was removed from the seat of government. 24 Finally,
the court concluded that the aid the city provided-which
consisted only of allowing the sponsor to use the amphitheater
and covering any electricity use above the flat-fee reimbursement
paid by the sponsor-was "indirect and de minimis," and thus did
not appreciably entangle the city with religion.25
Even when my court has not expressly applied the Lemon
test, its religious display cases have sought to follow Lemon's
general teaching that government should be neutral between
16

Id.

17 Id.
Is Id.

19 Id. at

20

778.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 779.
23 Id. at 782.
24 Id.
I Id. at 789.
21

22
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religions. This guiding theme was evident in the court's decision
in American Jewish Congress v. City of Beverly Hills.26 There, a
group of plaintiffs challenged the City of Beverly Hills's decision
to permit a private group-Chabad-to "erect a 27-foot menorah
in a public park near city hall during the holiday season." The
city had a general rule forbidding the erection of large
unattended displays on public property, but had granted an
exception to allow Chabad to erect its display. 28 The district
court held that the city could allow the display to stand if, among
other conditions, a Christmas tree of similar size was placed
nearby and a disclaimer sign was viewable from both directions
of the nearby public street.29
The Ninth Circuit reversed that decision.30
The court
emphasized that the City had vested "standardless discretion in
its officials to grant exceptions" to the general prohibition on
large unattended displays on public property. 3 ' Although the city
could constitutionally ban all unattended private displays in its
parks, the court explained, in this case it had granted an
exception to one group, based on no clear standard.3 2 Such a
policy "allows for arbitrary application" and "leaves open the
possibility of improper discrimination by the City."3 3 "Permitting
the erection of Chabad's menorah pursuant to this policy," the
court held, "violates the Establishment Clause."34
After American Jewish Congress, my court decided several

cases involving Latin crosses, again emphasizing themes of
neutrality and non-endorsement. In Separation of Church &
State Committee v. City of Eugene ("SCSC"), for example, we held
that the City of Eugene, Oregon, violated the Establishment
Clause by owning and displaying a fifty-one-foot concrete Latin
cross in a public park.' In reaching that conclusion, the court
emphasized that "It]he maintenance of the cross in a public park
by the City of Eugene may reasonably be perceived as providing
26
27

21
29

90 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 381.
Id.

3o Id. at 386.

21 Id. at 383.

Id. at 384.
3 Id. at 385.
14 Id. at 386.
3 93 F.3d 617, 618-20 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
32
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official approval of one religious faith over others."3 6 Such
"governmental endorsement of Christianity," the court held,
violates the Establishment Clause.
I filed an opinion concurring in the result.3 8 But, I did this
"because I believe [d] the court owe [d] the City of Eugene a better
explanation of why" the cross at issue was being "condemned." 9
I also wrote "to emphasize that the court applie[d] the wrong
legal standard" even though "it reache[d] the judgment compelled
by current Supreme Court jurisprudence."4 0
I began by explaining that the Establishment Clause "was
intended to serve a relatively limited purpose"-mainly "to
prevent Congress from establishing a national religion" and more
generally "to prohibit Congress from legislating on the subject of
religion, thereby leaving church-state relations to the individual
states."4 1 Establishment Clause case law, however, "br[oke] with
the original understanding of the Clause" in the middle of the
twentieth century.4 2 The focus of that jurisprudence then became
the maintenance of a "wall of separation" between religion and
the government-whether at the national or state level.4 3 This
wall-of-separation-driven jurisprudence, I explained, culminated
in the Lemon v. Kurtzman decision.44
I then canvassed the criticism that Lemon had endured since
the Court adopted it.4 5 Despite that criticism, I acknowledged
that the Supreme Court had not abandoned Lemon and had
regularly applied the test or had carefully applied a variation of
it-such as the so-called "endorsement" test.46
I argued that this case required such a careful endorsement
analysis.4 7 The majority, I explained, erred in reaching its
holding "solely on the naked assertion that a 'Latin cross is a
symbol of Christianity.' "48 In cases involving a religious display
36

Id.

at 619.

Id. at 619-20.
38 See id. at 620 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
3 Id.
3

40

Id.

Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 622.
4 Id.
4 Id.
4 Id.
41

42

46

Id.

at 622-23.

See id. at 624.
4 Id.
4
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on government property, I explained, applicable Supreme Court
law required us to pay close attention to "the context in which
the religious symbol [] [is] displayed"-for example, whether a
religious
symbol
"was
displayed
along with
other
secular ... decorations" or instead stands alone.4 9
Finally, I explained that this test "compels the conclusion
that the City's display of the cross is unconstitutional.""o
Although "the cross has a secular purpose"-it had been
designated a war memorial in 1970-"observers might
reasonably perceive the City's display of such a religious symbol
on public property as government endorsement of the Christian
faith."5 ' Moreover, "the City's use of a cross to memorialize the
war dead may lead observers to believe that the City has chosen
to honor only Christian veterans."5 2
This conclusion was
unfortunate-and was well at odds with the original meaning of
the Establishment Clause-but under Supreme Court case law
"the cross violate[d] the Establishment Clause merely because
someone could reasonably perceive the cross as the City's
endorsement of the Christian faith."5 3 Although the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause case law had "not always [been]
clear, consistent or coherent," I believed that it required the
result reached by the panel majority."
A second notable Latin cross case is Buono v. Norton." The
cross in Buono was displayed on federally-owned land in the
Mojave National Preserve. 6 Finding that the case was "squarely
controlled" by SCSC, the court ruled that the cross violated the
Establishment Clause and affirmed the district court's injunction
barring the government from permitting the display of the
cross." In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit emphasized
the context of the display. The court observed that the cross sat
on publicly-owned land, religious services had been held at the
cross since at least 1935, the cross site had not been opened to
other permanent displays, no other displays were in the area,
' Id. at 624-25.
90

Id.

at 626.

51 Id.

Id.
53 Id.
64 Id. at 627.
56 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004).
56 Id. at 544.
" Id. at 548, 550.
52

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

78

[Vol. 52:71

and a third-party's request to erect a Buddhist display near the
cross had been denied." Although the cross was only "five to
eight feet tall" and in a more remote location than the one in
SCSC, the court ruled that "[t]hese distinctions are of no
moment."59 To begin with, the cross at issue in Buono was
"bolted to a rock outcropping [that rose] fifteen to twenty feet
above grade and [could be seen from] vehicles on the adjacent
road from a hundred yards away."" And although the cross was
in a remote location, that was immaterial, the court ruled,
because the cross sat on public park land." Moreover, the court
observed, a reasonable observer would know that the government
had "denied similar access for expression by an adherent of
the ... Buddhist faith."6 2 The critical point, in the end, was that
the cross improperly "projectled] a message of government
endorsement to a reasonable observer." 63

C
After our decisions in Kreisner, American Jewish Congress,

SCSC, and Buono, the Supreme Court developed a different
Establishment Clause test for at least some cases involving

5

Id. at 548-49.

Id. at 549.
Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 550.
63 Id. at 549. Controversy over the cross continued. While the Buono v. Norton
appeal was pending, Congress passed a statute directing the Secretary of the
Interior to transfer the federal government's interest in the land on which the cross
was located. When the government began moving forward with the transfer, Buono
moved the district court to enforce its injunction-which by then had been affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit. The district court ruled that the transfer scheme did not
comply with its injunction and was an improper attempt to keep the cross in place.
The district court therefore enjoined the government from implementing the landtransfer statute. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069,
1071 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1802 (2010). In a
splintered decision, a plurality of the Supreme Court ruled that the district court did
not properly consider whether the land-transfer statute-among other
circumstances-obviated the need for an injunction against the federal government.
The Court remanded to allow the district court to conduct a proper inquiry into
whether injunctive relief was still needed. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803,
1821 (2010). In 2012, the parties settled the dispute. The district court then vacated
its injunction and dismissed the case. See Order Approving Settlement Agreement
and Vacating Injunction at 2, Buono v. Salazar, No. 5:01-CV-00216-RT (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 23, 2012).
6
60
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religion displays. In Van Orden v. Perry," the Supreme Court
ruled on an Establishment Clause challenge to a Ten
Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas State
Capitol." Believing that the Lemon test was "not useful in
dealing with the sort of passive monument" before it, a fourJustice plurality focused on "the nature of the monument
and ... our Nation's history" to conclude that the display did not
violate the Establishment Clause." The plurality emphasized
the role of God and the Ten Commandments in the nation's
founding and history, the monument's passive use, and its
historical meaning.
Justice Breyer provided the fifth vote in Van Orden." He
thought it to be a "difficult" case that must be decided by "the
exercise of legal judgment" rather than by a "test-related
substitute" for such judgment.
Such judgment should, he
explained, be exercised based upon a fact-intensive assessment of
whether the display of the monument keeps faith with the
purposes of the Establishment Clause."
Justice Breyer
contended that this type of case must be decided by flexibly
considering many factors-not only the Lemon prongs-including
the monument's purpose, how viewers perceive the monument,
the extent to which the monument's physical setting suggests
religious meaning, and the monument's history." He concluded
that the display of the commandments should not be ruled
unconstitutional because such a ruling could "lead the law to
exhibit a hostility toward religion."72 That result, he said, could
"create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid."7

545 U.S. 677 (2005).
at 681.
66 Id. at 686 (plurality opinion).
67 Id.
at 686-87, 689-90.
1 Id. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 700.
r"

6Id.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 701-03.
Id. at 704.
Id.

72

7
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D
My court's most recent foray into the constitutionality of
religious symbols followed Van Orden. Trunk v. City of San
Diego involved a challenge to a forty-three foot tall Latin cross
and veterans' memorial atop Mount Soledad-an 822-foot hillin La Jolla, California.
The case had an extensive history. A Latin cross has been
atop Mount Soledad since 1913."6 After an earlier cross blew
down in 1952, the current cross was erected in 1954 and was
dedicated as a memorial to American service members and as a
tribute to God's "promise to man of everlasting life."" The cross
is "twenty-nine feet high and twelve feet across[,] stands atop a
fourteen foot high base," and is visible for miles and from the
The cross had been raised by the
nearby interstate freeway.
Mount Soledad Memorial Association, a civic association that
also contributed to its maintenance. Some public funds had also
been expended on the cross.
Although the cross long stood on Mount Soledad by itself, in
the late 1990s the war memorial became more extensive, with
the cross as the centerpiece." The memorial included some 2,100
black stone plaques honoring veterans, platoons, and groups of
soldiers; twenty-three bollards-posts-honoring community and
veterans' organizations; and an American flag that flies from a
large flagpole.8 0 "Until the events leading up to this suit, the
Memorial stood on land belonging to the City.""
For two decades, beginning in the early 1990s, the memorial
was the subject of litigation.8 2 Relevant here, in 2006, Congress
passed a law to seize the Mount Soledad land "in order to
preserve a historically significant war memorial ... as a national

629 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012).
Id. at 1102.
76 Id. at 1101.
n Id. at 1103.
78 Id.
79 Id.
7
75

80 Id.
81 Id.
82

Id.
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memorial honoring veterans of the United States Armed
Forces.""
The federal government took possession of the
memorial that year.8 4
Congress's action spurred two lawsuits challenging the
government's acquisition of the memorial.
Those suits
culminated in the most recent Ninth Circuit decision in the
dispute. In 2008, the district court held that Congress had acted
with a secular purpose in acquiring the memorial and that the
memorial did not advance religion. It therefore ruled that the
City had not violated the Establishment Clause by permitting
the display of the Mount Soledad cross.
The Ninth Circuit reversed that decision." The court panel
agreed with the district court that Congress acted with a
predominantly secular purpose when it acquired the memorial.
But the court concluded that the memorial's primary effect is
religious.
In reaching that conclusion, the court analyzed the
"meaning or meanings of the Latin cross at the Memorial's
center, the Memorial's history, its secularizing elements, its
physical setting, and the way the Memorial is used."9 0
The court first explained that the Latin cross is an
exclusively, or at least iconic, Christian symbol." The court then
decided that a reasonable observer would view a memorial cross
as sectarian.9 2
In reaching that determination, the court
emphasized record evidence showing that the Latin cross is not
commonly used as a war memorial and that the cross "remains a
Christian symbol, not a military symbol."
Moving to the memorial's history, its secularizing elements,
and how it has been used, the majority emphasized that the
memorial had long consisted only of the cross, that the memorial
had long been recognized and promoted for its religious nature
rather than as a memorial, and that the memorial's use for
I Id. at 1104 (citations omitted).
84
85

Id. at 1105.
Id.

86 Id.
8

Id.

at 1125.

* Id. at 1108.
89

Id. at 1110.

90 Id.
1 Id. at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92

9

Id. at 1112.
See id. at 1112-16.
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secular and veteran-recognizing events has been spotty.94 The
court added that the memorial's use for religious purposes had
been contentious, and the community in which the cross is
located has a history of anti-Semitism "that reinforces the
Memorial's sectarian effect."95 In short, the court explained, "a
reasonable observer viewing the Memorial would be confronted
with an initial dedication for religious purposes, its long history
of religious use, widespread public recognition of the Cross as a
Christian symbol, and the history of religious discrimination in
La Jolla."96 "These factors," the court concluded, "cast a long
shadow of sectarianism over the Memorial that has not been
overcome by the fact that it is also dedicated to fallen soldiers, or
by its comparatively short history of secular events."9 7
As to the memorial's physical setting, the court noted that
the cross is the memorial's primary feature, "with the secular
elements subordinated to it."98
Overall, the court concluded that "[b]y claiming to honor all
service members with a symbol that is intrinsically connected to
a particular religion," the government was sending a message of
exclusion to non-adherents.9 9 The court therefore held that the
memorial, "presently configured and as a whole, primarily
conveys a message of government endorsement of religion that
violates the Establishment Clause."oo
The Ninth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to fashion an appropriate
remedy.' 0

* Id. at 1118-19.

* Id. at 1121-22.
Id. at 1122.
9 Id.
98 Id. at 1123.
9 Id. at 1125.
96

100

Id.

101Id. After the Conference, the Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari in
the case. See Mount Soledad Mem'1 Ass'n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535, 2535 (2012). In a
statement regarding that denial, Justice Alito observed that the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence "is undoubtedly in need of clarity." Id. But
because the case had not reached a final judgment-and because it remained
unclear what action the district court would order the federal government to takehe believed that Supreme Court review would be premature. Id. at 2536.
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II
As we move across the Atlantic, we see a somewhat different
view on the challenges presented by the public display of
religious symbols.
A

In 2002, Soile Lautsi brought suit in Italian administrative
court on behalf of herself and her children against the Italian
Government, which required that crucifixes be displayed in state
school classrooms.10 2 Lautsi, who is not Christian and who
believes in secularism, alleged that this requirement violates the
Italian constitution and the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European
Convention on Human Rights").103 Specifically, she alleged that
the presence of crucifixes in state school classrooms interfered
with her ability to raise her children in accordance with her
religious and philosophical beliefs.1
Italy's administrative court upheld the requirement to
display crucifixes in state schools. 0 It reasoned that, although
the crucifix is a Christian religious symbol, it has significant
historical and cultural meaning. 0 6 It is also, the administrative
court concluded, a "symbol of a value system underpinning the
Italian Constitution" and was compatible with the principle of
secularism. 107
The Consiglio di Stato-Supreme Administrative Courtaffirmed the administrative court's judgment.108 In doing so, the
court confirmed that displaying a crucifix is consistent with

102Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 1 10-12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040. The
obligation in Italy to hang crucifixes pre-dates the birth of the Italian state,
originating from an 1860 royal decree. Id. 17. The requirement was re-enforced in
the 1920s. Id.
19-20. In 1948, Italy adopted its Constitution, which provided for
freedom of religion. Id. 1 21.
103 Id. 1 12.
10 Id.

41.

1o5

15.

106
107

Id.
Id.
Id.

1- Id.

16.
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secularism, in part because the symbol is "capable of expressing,
symbolically of course, but appropriately, the religious origin of
those values . . . which characterise Italian civilisation." 09
Lautsi then brought her case before the European Court of
Human Rights ("ECHR"), alleging violations of three provisions
of the Convention: Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, Article 9, and
Article 14.110 These provisions protect the right to education, the
freedom of religion, and the right to be free from discrimination
on the basis of religion. Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 states:
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the
exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to
education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity
with their own religions and philosophical convictions."
Article 9 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.112
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."'
And Article 14 says that "[t]he enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as . . . religion."

4

109 Id.

Id. %%
29, 79.
nI Id. %29 (quoting Protocol to the Convention for
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, opened for
(Council of Europe) (entered into force May 18, 1952)).
n2 Id. (quoting Convention for the Protection
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9, opened for signature Nov.
(Council of Europe) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)).
n13Id. (quoting Convention for the Protection
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9, opened for signature Nov.
(Council of Europe) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)).
114 Id. T
79.
110

the Protection of Human
signature Mar. 20, 1952
of Human Rights and
5, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
of Human Rights and
5, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND THE LAW

2013]

85

A seven-judge Chamber held that Article 2 of Protocol No. 1
and Article 9 of the Convention had been violated."' The
Chamber emphasized that the State was obliged not to impose its
beliefs on its citizens, particularly in sensitive places such as
schools."6 The Chamber concluded that the crucifix was a
religious symbol that might disturb non-Christians and that
placing it in classrooms would inhibit parents' ability to educate
their children in accordance with their own beliefs. Thus, a
crucifix requirement was "incompatible with the State's duty to
respect neutrality."" 7
The Italian government requested a referral to a Grand
Chamber, which accepted the case."" In front of the Grand
Chamber, the government argued that the Chamber had
confused neutrality with secularism, effectively requiring the
State to favor an "antireligious" approach.11 9 The government
further emphasized that the crucifix was a passive symbol that
did not affect the content of students' lessons and did not impede
parents' ability to raise their children as desired.2 0
The
government urged the court to leave to the State the balancing of
interests between national traditions and popular feelings. 121
Lautsi countered that the crucifix requirement was an
inappropriate expression by the State of a preference for a
particular religion in a place where views are developed and
formed.12 2 She argued that because of the sensitive nature of
schools, the State must provide a neutral space where all views
are recognized and can be freely expressed.123
This is
particularly important, she argued, where there was a need to
protect minority viewpoints.124

Id. T 30.
Id. H 30-31.
' Id.
32 (quoting Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06,
57 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 3,
2009), available at http//hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00195589).
n1 Id.
5.
"

116

119 Id.
120 Id.

35.

123

Id.
Id.
Id.

36.
37.
41.
43.

1

Id.

45.

121
122
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B

The Grand Chamber first set forth the principles governing
its decision. Under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 a State must
"respect . . . the right of parents to ensure such education and
teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions."12 5 To "respect" in this context means more than to
" 'acknowledge' or 'take into account'. . . it implies some positive
obligation on the part of the State." 26 The court stressed,
however, that states have wide latitude in determining how to
comply with the Convention.'2 7 The Convention does not, for
example, give parents the prerogative to require particular
teaching; curricular decisions are within the State's purview.
And the Convention does not prevent the State from providing
religious and philosophical lessons.'2 8 What the Convention does
require is that information be conveyed in an objective,
pluralistic manner in an "atmosphere free of any proselytism." 2 9
With these principles in mind, the Grand Chamber turned to
the question whether the Convention permits the display of
crucifixes in state classrooms. The Grand Chamber agreed with
the original Chamber's decision that the crucifix is
predominantly a religious symbol.'3 0 But the Grand Chamber did
not find this fact to command the conclusion drawn by the
Chamber, because there was no evidence that the presence of the
crucifix had an influence on students.'
While acknowledging
that Lautsi or her children might take a crucifix as showing
disrespect for their beliefs, the Grand Chamber concluded that
subjective perception of disrespect was not enough to establish a
violation of Article 2.132
Similarly, the Grand Chamber
recognized the wide margin of appreciation'33 granted to states in
matters of historical tradition and cultural development, but
125
126
127
128
129
1o

131
132

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

59, 61.
61.
62.

66.

Id.
Id.

1"
This doctrine recognizes that, where national tradition or sensitive cultural
issues are at stake, states are in the best position to address these issues in light of
their legal and cultural circumstances. They are thus granted a "margin of
appreciation" to do so within which the court will defer to their determinations.
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concluded that states could not evade the Convention's
requirements by reference to such interests.13 4 Thus, the
question before the court was whether Italy's crucifix
requirement exceeded the discretion afforded to states and
entered the realm of indoctrination. 135
The court concluded, by a fifteen to two vote, that the State
had not exceeded this boundary.' 3 6 The court was persuaded by
the lack of European consensus on whether it was proper to
display religious symbols on State property. 1 37 The court further
found that because the crucifix is a passive symbol, its presence
is unlikely to violate the principle of neutrality, particularly
where it is not associated with "compulsory teaching about
Christianity" and where the State opens the school environment
to other religions.3 s Indeed, Lautsi did not even allege that the
crucifix encouraged or was associated with proselytizing.'
Taken together, the circumstances demonstrated that Italian
authorities had acted within the margin of appreciation afforded
to states and had not violated Lautsi's Article 2 of Protocol No. 1
right to ensure teaching in conformity with her own
convictions. 140
Lautsi generated several separate opinions. Judge Bonello's
strongly worded concurring opinion contended that the ECHR
generally lacks the competence to address sensitive domestic
disagreements.14 ' In his view, "[a] court of human rights cannot
allow itself to suffer from historical Alzheimer's. It has no right
to disregard the cultural continuum of a nation's flow through
time, nor to ignore what, over the centuries, has served to mould
and define the profile of a people."'4 2 He characterized Lautsi's
claims as an invitation to the court to "bankrupt centuries of
European tradition" and to "veto overnight what has survived

Lautsi, No. 30814/06, 68.
Id. 69-70.
136 Id.
76-77.
1'
See id. $ 70.
13s Id.
72, 74 (noting that many State schools celebrated the end of Ramadan,
that students were allowed to wear Islamic headscarves and other non-Christian
symbols, and that alternative arrangements could be made for non-majority
religious education).
13 Id. 9 74.
140 Id.
9 76-77.
141 Id.
at 38 (Bonello, J., concurring).
142 Id.
134
135
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countless generations."1 43 In Judge Bonello's view, "secularism,
pluralism, the separation of Church and State, religious
neutrality, [and] religious tolerance" are not protected by the
Convention.'" All that is protected is the freedom of religion and
conscience, he argued, and the court lacks the authority to "bully"
States into secularism or religious neutrality.145 Judge Bonello
further reasoned that requiring the removal of crucifixes would
be an "act of intolerance" that would impose the views of the
parents of one student over the philosophy of the other twentynine pupils in the class.1 46
Judge Power's concurrence reiterated that the Convention
does not compel secularism. 4 7 Judge Power emphasized that
"[the test of a violation .. . is not 'offence' but 'coercion'" and
that a passive religious symbol, though it may carry meaning,
"does not compel or coerce an individual to do or to refrain from

doing anything."148

Only two of the seventeen judges dissented.' 9 Written by
Judge Malinverni and joined by Judge Kalaydjieva, the dissent
argued that the majority exaggerated the lack of consensus on
In the dissent's
the propriety of displaying religious symbols.'
view, because only a few states provide for the display of
religious symbols in state schools and most states leave the
matter unregulated, the court could not draw conclusions about
The dissent would also
consensus among the member states.'
have taken a narrower view of the margin of appreciation
afforded to states when the Convention imposes an obligation on
them. 52 The dissent would have required not only the school
curriculum but also the school environment to observe the
"strictest denominational neutrality."5 3 Because the State has

14

Id.

" Id. at 39-40.
145

14
147

Id. at 40
Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
Id. at 44-45 (Power, J., concurring).

14

Id. at 45.
See id. at 31.

15

See id. at 47 (Malinverni, J., dissenting).

4

151 Id.
152

Id.

13

Id. at 51.
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failed to observe such neutrality, the dissent would have ruled
that the Italian government had violated Article 2 of Protocol No.
1 and Article 9.15

Reaction to the Lautsi case has been mixed. The initial 2009
Chamber decision was viewed as consistent with a trend in the
Recognizing the
court's jurisprudence toward secularization.'
difficulty of balancing individuals' religious freedom with states'
need to regulate religious expression to preserve stability, some
believed that the ECHR was endorsing a ban on religious
symbols in public life. 6 It would now appear, however, that the
ECHR is more concerned with ensuring stability than in
promoting an individual's right to religious freedom.'s
Furthermore, the Chamber's apparent view that religious liberty
is protected only by eradicating religious symbols and expression
from public life was greeted with skepticism and outrage in
countries like Italy that believe public life is enriched by religious
culture. '

1"

Id.

1"5 See, e.g., Grzelak v. Poland, No. 7710/02, 7 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 15, 2010),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-99384
(finding violation of Articles 9 and 14 where student was exempted from religion
class but report card was marked blank, and no alternative class was offered); Dogru
v. France, No. 27058/05, 1 7-8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 4, 2008), available at
(upholding
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90039
expulsion of Muslim student who refused to remove headscarf during physical
education classes); Folgere v. Norway, no. 15472/02, 3 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29,
2007), available at httpf//hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-81356
(finding violation of Article 2 where school failed to provide exemption to nonChristian students from a course on Christianity and religion); Sahin v. Turkey, No.
2005),
available at
Nov.
10,
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
[ 17
44774/98,
no
(finding
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956
violation of Article 9 where state university refused to let Muslim student sit for
exams because wearing headscarf was contrary to state rules); Dahlab v.
Switzerland, No. 42393/98, at 14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 15, 2010), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-22643 (upholding ban on
teacher wearing headscarf while teaching). See generally John Witte, Jr. & NinaLouisa Arnold, Lift High the Cross?: Contrastingthe New European and American
Cases on Religious Symbols on Government Property, 25 EMORY INVL L. REV. 5
(2011) (summarizing trends).
156 See, e.g., Witte, supra note 155, at 25-27.
15 See, e.g., Andrea Pin, (European) Stars or (American) Stripes: Are the
European Court of Human Rights' Neutrality and the Supreme Court's Wall of
Separation One and the Same?, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 627, 642-44 (2011).
I" See, e.g., Andrea Pin, Public Schools, the Italian Crucifix, and the European
Court of Human Rights: The Italian Separation of Church and State, 25 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 95, 97-100 (2011).
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III
As is likely obvious already, it is difficult to see any clear
trends from the developing case law. Cases involving religious
symbols are always sensitive and often important and, in the
ECHR and the United States, judges appear to struggle in every
case to strike the right balance between weighty and
Though
often competing-interests.
longstanding-but
synthesizing all of the cases into a coherent whole may be
impossible, I draw what lessons and thoughts I can as we
continue to try to determine the appropriate role of religion in
public life.
To begin with, I must observe that if modern Establishment
Clause case law followed the original understanding, Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit decisions would be far more open to the
As I have explained
public display of religious symbols.
elsewhere, "the Establishment Clause was intended to serve a
relatively limited purpose."15 9 The Clause "was not intended to
erect a 'wall of separation' between church and state."6 o Such an
approach "was unknown and, indeed, unthinkable at the time of
the framing." 16 1 The Establishment Clause was adopted at a
time when "accommodation of religion was not only permitted
but encouraged," when state-as opposed to federal-religious
establishments persisted, and when the national government
itself regularly encouraged and promoted religion.'6 2 Had this
approach not given way in the last sixty-five years or so, our
jurisprudence would be far more accommodating to religion-and
far more like that endorsed in Lautsi.
Yet, interestingly, there are signs that Europe, too, is moving
away from the original understanding of the protections for
religion that are embedded in the Convention. For example,
many argued that the Chamber's judgment, by requiring state
neutrality, ran contrary to the text of the Convention, which,
unlike the United States Constitution, does not have an
Establishment Clause or otherwise refer to state neutrality. 6 3
The Convention was not meant to impose uniform requirements
159 Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 620
(9th Cir. 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
160 Id. at 621.
161 Id. at 620.
162 Id. at 621-22.
16
See, e.g., Pin, supra note 157, at 637-38.
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for protecting religious freedoms, some argue, and had the
Chamber's judgment been allowed to stand, it would have had
consequences for not only Italy but for the constitutional
traditions of many of the countries that subscribed to the
Convention.16 4
At the same time, I counsel caution on drawing too close a
connection between the United States' cases and the decision in
Lautsi. Europe and America have different religious traditions,
and it would be hard, this late in the day, to describe the two as
so alike. A notable distinction is that established religions
persist in Europe. When a European state is charged with
promoting an established religion, one would expect rulings such
as that in Lautsi that accommodate official religious expression.
Note, in this connection, the different texts that we are
interpreting. The United States Constitution prohibits Congress
from making any law "respecting an establishment of religion."6 s
But the ECHR contains no such prohibition and, indeed, the
Catholic heritage appears to enjoy a privileged position in
Italy. 6 1 We therefore begin from quite different places.
As a result, we have very different views on government
neutrality regarding religion. As mentioned above, the United
States Supreme Court has emphasized that the "touchstone" of
the Establishment Clause is the requirement of "governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion
and nonreligion."' By contrast, the Grand Chamber proclaimed
in Lautsi that a state's obligation to "respect the right of parents
to ensure the education and teaching of their children in
conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions" required more than mere acknowledgement-it
required a "positive obligation on the part of the State."68

164See id. at 640.
165 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'6 See Alessandro Ferrari & Silvio Ferrari, Religion and the Secular State: The
Italian Case, INT'L CENTER FOR LAW AND RELIGIOUS STUD. (2010),
http://www.iclrs.org/contentiblurb/files/Italy.pdf.
167 McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)
(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
1' Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, I[ 61, 65 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011),
available at http-//hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
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At the very least, we can say that the struggle to define the
role of religion and religious symbols in public life is far from
complete. 6 9 The cases I have covered show that, although we
may live in an increasingly secularized society, we remain aware
that religion is central to our identities and development. We
also see such historically important issues treated-at least some
of the time-with the sensitivity they deserve.

169 Cf., e.g., Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Catholic
Lawyers in an Age of Secularism,
43 CATH. LAw. 1, 1 (2004) (discussing how to be a "good Catholic and a good lawyer
at the same time").

